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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(g), Benjamin Puckett adopts by reference the 
Statement of the Case as set forth in the Brief of Respondents Jesyca Davidson and Kathy 
Guthrie. Mr. Puckett supplements the Course of Proceedings with the statement that on 
November 7,2008 Mr. Puckett filed his Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment on behalf of Benjamin 
Puckett? 
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ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on behalf of Benjamin 
Puckett. 
A. The trial court properly determined that the issue of immunity was 
to be decided by the court rather than a jury. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(g), Mr. Puckett adopts by reference 
Argument IV A, C, and D of the Brief of Respondents Jesyca Davidson and Kathy 
Guthrie. 
In addition to the authorities cited by Jesyca Davidson and Kathy Guthrie in their 
Argument IV A, Mr. Puckett directs the Court to May v. Southeast Wyoming Mental 
Health Center, 866 P.2d 732 (Wyo. 1993). In May the Wyoming Supreme Court 
indicated that the question of immunity should be decided by the trial court. 
The well-known standard of review for summary judgments has only 
minimal significance here. Rather, the summary judgments in this case 
can be upheld on the basis of immunity. Therefore, we need not search 
the record to see if there are disputed material facts, nor need we examine 
in detail the materials in support of summary judgment or in opposition. 
May, supra at 738. 
Mr. Davidson cites Rees v. Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 137 P.3d 
397 (2006) for the proposition that a trial court should not vary from the traditional 
summary judgment standards when considering issues of immunity. In Rees the plaintiff 
sued the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare and a department social worker for 
negligence. The Department and the social worker claimed immunity under the Idaho 
Tort Claims Act [hereinafter "ITCA"]. The trial court did not deviate from the 
traditional summary judgment standards in remanding the matter for trial because there 
existed sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact as to whether the 
Department or the social worker were negligent. Id. at 408. In not varying from the 
traditional standards for summary judgment the Court noted that liability is the rule and 
immunity is the exception under the ITCA. 
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The purpose of the ITCA is to provide "much needed relief to those 
suffering injury from the negligence of government employees. The 
ITCA is to be construed liberally, consistent with its purpose, and with a 
view to "attaining substantial justice." Therefore. under the ITCA 
liabilitv is the rule and immunitv is the exception. 
Id. at 406 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
Rees and cases based upon the ITCA are not persuasive of the standard to be used 
in determining immunity under the Idaho Child Protective Act, Idaho Code 516-601 et 
seq. [hereinafter "ICPA"]. The policy considerations which drive the ICPA are different 
from those which drive ITCA. Under the ITCA liability is the rule and immunity is the 
exception. Under the ICPA, which seeks to protect vulnerable children, immunity is the 
rule and liability is the exception. See Argument B infra. 
With regard to immunity under the ICPA the trial court should decide early on in 
the legal proceedings whether there is immunity or not. The spectre of a reporting party 
being forced to go through a long and expensive trial will have a chilling effect upon the 
reporting of child abuse. CfDobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77,530 S.E. 2d 829 (N.C. 2000) 
(In underscoring the purpose of summary judgment using traditional standards the North 
Carolina court stated, "This purpose is well served when the movant, who has reported 
child abuse or neglect in accord with statutory mandate, is accused of defamation for 
having done so, for there can he no disincentive to report greater than the spectre of the 
length and expense of a lawsuit." Id. at 77,530 S.E. 2d at 835.) 
B. Under the ICPA, George Davidson bears the burden of proving 
that Benjamin Puckett acted in bad faith or with malice. 
With respect to Argument IV B in the Brief of Respondents Jesyca Davidson and 
Kathy Guthrie, Respondent Benjamin Puckett argues that the issue is not whether Jesyca 
Davidson and Benjamin Puckett acted in good faith, but whether George Davidson 
established, for purposes of withstanding summary judgment, that Jesyca Davidson and 
Benjamin Puckett acted in bad faith or with malice. 
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Under the ICPA any "person having reason to believe, that a child under the age 
of 18 years of age has been abused" has the duty to report such abuse to the proper law 
enforcement agency or the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. Idaho Code 516- 
1605(1). Failure to report is a misdemeanor. Idaho Code $16-1605(2). 
Any person, who has reason to believe a child has been abused and reports the 
abuse as required under Idaho Code 516-1605, has immunity from any liability for so 
reporting. 
Any person who has reason to believe that a child has been abused, 
abandoned or neglected and, acting upon that belief. makes a report 
of abuse, abandonment or neglect as reauired in section 16-1605, 
Idaho Code. shall have immunitv from anv liahilitv, civil or criminal, 
that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Any such participant 
shall have the same immunity with respect to participation in any such 
judicial proceeding resulting from such report. Any person who reports in 
bad faith or with malice shall not be protected by this section. Any 
privilege between husband and wife, or between any professional person 
except the lawyer-client privilege, including but not limited to physicians, 
counselors, hospitals, clinics, day care centers and schools and their clients 
shall not be grounds for excluding evidence at any proceeding regarding 
the abuse, abandonment or neglect of the child or the cause thereof. 
Idaho Code 516-1606 (emphasis added). 
This section does not apply to any individual who reports in. bad faith or with 
malice and the following section gives an individual who has been reported against in bad 
faith or with malice a statutory cause of action for actual or statutory damages. 
Anv person who makes a report or allepation of child abuse, 
abandonment or  neglect knowing the same to be false or who reaorts 
or alleges the same in bad faith or with malice shall be liable to the 
partv or  parties against whom the report was made for the amount of 
actual damages sustained or statutorv damages of two thousand five 
hundred dollars ($2,500). whichever is greater, alus attornev's fees 
and costs of suit. If the court finds that the defendant acted with malice 
or oppression, the court may award treble actual damages or treble 
statutory damages, whichever is greater. 
Idaho Code 516-1607 (emphasis added). 
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Under the ICPA, in contrast with the ITCA, immunity is the rule and liability is 
the exception. The purpose of the ICPA is to protect abused children. Idaho Code $16- 
1601. In Rees v. Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 137 P.3d 397 (2006), the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Our legislature has made clear that health and safety of reportedly abused 
children is the focus of the ICPA. LC. 5 16-1601. This is not a general 
duty; rather it is a duty running to a narrow class of persons-abused and 
neglected children-who are particularly vulnerable because they allegedly 
suffer abuse in the privacy of their homes and cannot protect themselves. 
Additionally, the ICPA and IDAPA make clear this state's policy to 
protect the life, health and welfare of children endangered by abuse or 
neglect by taking mandatory actions to prevent further abuse and neglect. 
Our legislature has created a duty owed to a narrow, easily identified class 
of persons to be protected from a particular harm. 
Rees v. Dept. of Health and Welfare, supra at 18, 137 P.3d at 405. 
Consistent with this policy of protecting vulnerable children, the ICPA protects 
reporting individuals from liability by granting them immunity. If there were no 
immunity, these individuals would be reluctant to report suspected abuse. This 
immunity, however, is not absolute. Because of a secondary goal of protecting reported 
individuals from bad faith or malicious reporting, the ICPA creates a cause of action for 
reported individuals who can prove that a reporting individual acted in bad faith or with 
malice. Thus, in the present case, Mr. Puckett, the reporting party is entitled to immunity 
under Idaho Code 616-1606 and Mr. Davidson, the reported party, has a cause of action 
under Idaho Code 616-1607, but he bears the burden of proving that Mr. Puckett acted in 
bad faith or with malice. 
This division of the burden under the statute is consistent with the principal that 
the exception to the statutory duty falls upon the individual proving the exception. 
In allocating the burdens, courts consistently attempt to distinguish 
between the constituent elements of a promise or of a statutory command, 
which must be proved by the party who relies on the contract or statute, 
and matters of exception, which must be proved by its adversary. Often 
the result of this approach is an arbitrary allocation of the burdens, as the 
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statutory language may be due to a mere casual choice of form by the 
draftsman. However, the distinction may be a valid one in some instances, 
particularly when the exceptions to a statute or promise are numerous. If 
that is the case, fairness usually requires that the adversary give notice of 
the particular exception upon which it relies and therefore that it bear the 
burden of pleading. The burdens of proof will not always follow the 
burden of pleading in these cases. However, exceptions generally point to 
exceptional situations. If proof of the facts is inaccessible or not 
persuasive, it is usually fairer to act as if the exceptional situation did not 
exist and therefore to place the burden of proof and persuasion on the 
party claiming its existence. 
K. Broun, McCormick On Evidences 337 (6Ih ed); Wisconsin v. Kenneth Big 
John, 432 N.W. 2d 576,583 (Wis. 1.988). 
Under the ICPA the duty to report and immunity for reporting are set forth first in 
Idaho Code 516-1605 and 516-1606. This is the rule. The exception to the rule of 
immunity is subsequently set forth in Idaho Code 516-1606 and then in Idaho Code 
51607: if a reporting party reports in bad faith or with malice he has no immunity under 
Idaho Code 516-1606 and the reported party may sue to recover actual or statutory 
damages under Idaho Code 516-1607. 
In addition, this division of the burden of proof is consistent with the principal of 
placing the burden on the party required to prove the affirmative of a fact and not the 
negative. Pace V. Hymas, 111 Idaho 581,585 - 586,726 P. 2d 693,697 - 698 (1986); cf 
Lyons v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 406 - 407, 565 P.2d 1360, 
1363 - 1364 (1977). Under the ICPA the relevant fact to be proven with respect to 
immunity is whether Mr. Puckett's report was made in bad faith or with malice. This is 
an affirmative fact for Mr. Davidson, i.e. Mr. Puckett's report was made in bad faith or 
with malice. It is a negative fact, however, for Mr. Puckett, i.e. the report was made 
in bad faith or notwi th  malice. Therefore, Mr. Davidson should bear the burden of 
proof. 
Finally, this placement of the burden upon the reported party is similar to the 
statutory scheme in other jurisdictions. A number of other jurisdictions have provided 
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the reporting party with a presumption that they have acted in good faith and required the 
reported party to rebut this presumption. Howe v. Andereck, 882 So. 2d 240 (Miss. App. 
2004); Dobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 530 S.E. 2d 829 (N.C. 2000); May supra; 
Kempster v. Child Protective Services, 130 A.D. 2d 623, 515 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1987). 
These statutory schemes parallel the IPCA in that the burden of going forward initially 
lies with the party claiming they were reported party against in bad faith or with malice. 
It differs in that under the IPCA, the burden of persuasion always remains with the party 
claiming that they were reported against in bad faith or with malice. 
C. Even under the traditional standards of summary judgment, the 
trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Benjamin 
Puckett. 
In addition to the authority cited by Jesyca Davidson and Kathy Guthrie in 
Argument IV D of their brief, Mr. Puckett directs the Court to the Petricevich v. Salmon 
River Canal Co., which more fully sets out the "mere scintilla of evidence or only slight 
doubt" standard. 
This court has recently rejected the 'slightest doubt' test in Tri-State Nat. 
Bank v. Western Gateway Storage Co., 92 Idaho 543, 447 P.2d 409 
(1968), stating: 
G *  * * the rule (I.R.C.P. 56(c)) itself, in permitting summary judgment 
where 'no genuine issue of any material fact' appears, plainly requires 
more to forestall summary judgment than the raising of the 'slightest 
doubt' as to the facts.' 447 P.2d at 412. 
In our opinion the better rule is that summary judgment will be granted 
whenever on the basis of the evidence before the court a directed verdict 
would be warranted or whenever reasonable men could not disagree as to 
the facts. . . . 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, & [sic] 
1234, p. 133 (Rules ed. 1958), citing cases, states that 
'Flimsy or transparent contentions, theoretical questions of fact which are 
not genuine, or disputes as to matters of form do not create genuine issues 
which will preclude summary judgment. Neither is a mere pleading 
allegation sufficient to create a genuine issue as against affidavits and 
other evidentiary materials which show the allegation to be false. A mere 
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scintilla of evidence is not enough to create an issue; there must be 
evidence on which a jury might rely. A popular formula is that summary 
judgment should be granted on the same kind of showing as would permit 
direction of a verdict were the case to be tried.' (Emphasis added.) (at pp. 
132-133). 
Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co. 92 Idaho 865,871,452 P.2d 362,368 
(1969) (citations omitted). 
To withstand a motion for summary judgment the non-moving party claiming bad 
faith or malice must produce objective evidence of the same. Conclusory allegations of 
improper motives or maliciousness are insufficient. Jones v. Synder, 714 A.2d 453 (Pa. 
Super. 1998); Heinrich v. Conemaugh Valley Memorial Hospital, 436 Pa. Super, 465, 
648 A.2d 53, 58 (Pa. Super. 1994); Forrest v. Berlin Central School District$815 
N.Y.S.2d 774 (2006). There must be direct or circumstantial evidence that the reporting 
party acted with bad faith or malice. Cf Jones supra. The alleged animosity of the 
reporting party towards the reported party does not make the report a bad faith report. 
Warner V. Mitts, 211 Mich. App. 557,560,536 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. App. 1995). 
Black's Law Dictionary (71h ed. 1999) defines bad faith as "[dlishonesty in belief 
or purpose." quoted in Cohbley v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130,135, 139 P.3d 732,737 
(Idaho, 2006). In O'Neil v. Vasseur the Idaho Court of Appeals, while discussing the tort 
of bad faith, stated that "[blad faith embodies a dishonest purpose and breach of the 
known duty of good faith and fair dealing through some motive of self-interest or ill- 
will." O'Neil v. Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257,262,796 P.2d 134,139 (Idaho App. 1990). 
The Georgia Court of Appeals provided a similar definition of bad faith in the 
child protection context: 
'Bad faith' is the opposite of 'good faith,' generally implying or involving 
actual or constructive fraud; or a design to mislead or deceive another; or a 
neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty, not prompted by an honest mistake 
as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive. 'Bad 
faith' is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but it imports a dishonest 
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purpose or some moral obliquity, and implies conscious doing of wrong, 
and means breach of known duty through some motive of interest or ill 
will. 
Baldwinn County Hospital Authority v. Trawick, 233 Ga. App. 539,541.504 S.E. 
2d 708 (Ga. App. 1998) 
Idaho Code $18-101(4) defines malice as a "wish to vex, annoy or injure another 
person, or an intent to do a wrongful act." 
In summary, to withstand Mr. Puckett's motion for summary judgment, Mr. 
Davidson had the burden of showing by means of direct or circumstantial evidence, 
sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for a directed verdict, that Mr. Puckett acted in 
bad faith or with malice. Mr. Davidson provided no such objective evidence and the trial 
court correctly granted Mr. Puckett's motion for summary judgment. 
Mr. Davidson's Statement of Facts does not identify any facts which indicate that 
Mr. Puckett acted in bad faith or with malice. His Statement of Facts merely states that 
on July 17, 2007 Jesyca Davidson and Benjamin Puckett went to the St. Luke's 
emergency room because the minor child "S" had touched herself and said "Grandpa," 
that St. Luke's could find no physical evidence of abuse, and that the following day, July 
18,2007, Renato Davidson, the father of "S", filed a motion for full custody of "S". Mr. 
Davidson's Statement of Facts makes no other references to Mr. Puckett. This is no 
showing of bad faith or malice on the part of Mr. Puckett. The reporting of suspected 
child abuse which cannot be corroborated by physical evidence does not show that an 
individual has acted in bad faith or with malice. 
Mr. Davidson argues that because Mr. Puckett has a strong emotional reaction to 
people he believes may be guilty of child sexual abuse, that Mr. Puckett's reporting was 
with malice. His strong emotional reaction is no such evidence, but rather substantiates 
his claim that he was reporting in good faith. If Mr. Puckett did not have a good faith 
belief that "S" was referring to Mr. Davidson when she said "Grandpa," he would not 
have had the emotional reaction that he had regarding Mr. Davidson. Malice requires 
more than a strong negative emotional reaction to facts that one believes are true. If that 
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were the case, anyone who reported child abuse and had a strong negative emotional 
reaction to child abuse would be liable under Idaho Code 516-1607. 
Mr. Davidson also argues that Mr. Puckett's statements in his affidavit in support 
of his motion for summary judgment are inadmissible because they are not based upon 
personal knowledge or they create material factual dispute because they differ with other 
statements made by Mr. Puckett or statements made by Jesyca Davidson or Kathy 
Guthrie. These arguments do not provide any evidence that Mr. Puckett acted in bad 
faith or with malice. 
The fact that Mr. Puckett did not see "S" expose herself and place her finger in 
her vagina is not relevant to his state of mind. Mr. Puckett was told by Jesyca Davidson 
that that was what "S" was doing, and based upon that information Mr. Puckett asked 
"S", "Who taught you that?" to which she replied "Grandpa." Mr. Puckett's affidavit 
establishes that be had a good faith basis for believing that "S" may have been abused. 
The fact that he did not see "S" place her finger in her vagina provides no evidence that 
he acted with bad faith or malice. Moreover, these minor variations in Mr. Puckett's 
account of what happened on July 17,2007 provide no evidence that he acted in bad faith 
or with malice. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Davidson has the burden of proof, but he has provided no objective evidence 
that Mr. Puckett acted in bad faith or with malice and the trial court correctly granted 
summary judgment in favor of Mr. Puckett. For the reasons set forth above, the Court 
should affirm the decision of the trial court in granting summary judgment on behalf of 
Mr. Puckett. 
Dated this z%ay of March, 2010. 
%4&2- 
MICHAEL E. DUGGAN 00 
Attorney for Respondent 
Benjamin Puckett 
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